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Hold

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE IN THE USSR
IN KOREA, UNDER VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES

CONCLUSIONS: It is estimated that:

1. At an early date, the USSR will propose a truce in Korea for and discussion of a basis/mediation.
2. The USSR will insist that withdrawal to the 38° Parallel shall be a subject for discussion and not an act to be accomplished before the truce.
3. The USSR will endeavor to prolong the discussions over the issues of withdrawal and nature of the mediation body.
4. Time acquired by prolongation of the discussions will be exploited by the occupying Communists to strengthen their position among the southern population by means of exhibition of their might, propaganda and indoctrination.
5. Some considerable time later - possibly after several months of stalemated discussion - the USSR will agree to withdrawal of Northern forces to the 38° Parallel, and will make a great show of its ability to compromise in the interest of peace. Whether or not discussions on mediation continue, however, will depend on Soviet estimate of the success in popular indoctrination during the period of occupation of southern areas by Communist forces.
6. Should the USSR estimate that a UN-sponsored election would result in a Communist government, it would agree to a basis for mediation leading to creation of a unified government. Should the USSR estimate that a resulting Communist government is uncertain, however, it would probably cause the discussions to be inconclusive and finally terminated, accepting a status quo ante

~~SECRET~~

as an easy "way out" of its miscalculated action in authorizing
the original invasion.

(The above conclusions are reached in view of the announced UN intent to proceed
only to the 38° Parallel.)

SECRET

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE USSR

IN KOREA, UNDER VARIOUS CONTINGENCES

DISCUSSION:

1. The USSR's course of action relative to Korea will be conditioned by development of one of the following contingences:

- a. Successful North Korean military conquest of all of Korea, with all UN ground operations terminated but with possibly continued air and naval operations.
- b. Stalemate at present line
- c. Successful UN counterattack evidencing inability of North Korea alone to hold southern Korea, the UN maintaining its present intent only to push North Korean forces north of the 38th Parallel.
- d. Successful UN counterattack accompanied by expressed intent to extend military operations to the Korean-Manchurian border, and to unify Korea under UN sponsored elections.

2. With respect to the above alternative contingencies, the USSR is likely to consider the following courses of action, the selected course or courses to be determined in the light of Soviet intentions in Korea and of consequences related to Soviet global objectives.

- a. In the event of successful North Korean conquest of all of Korea, and termination of all UN ground operations, the USSR is most likely to sponsor Communist-type elections leading to establishment of a Communist government for all of Korea. Direct Soviet participation probably will be concealed. Should the USSR estimate that the success of the Communist forces has so raised Communist prestige among the masses, and that the presence of Communist forces in all of Korea assures development of a Communist government even with elections

held under US sponsorship, the USSR probably would propose a UN-

SECRET

sponsored election, intending thereby to facilitate addition of this Communist government to the Soviet bloc in the UN (This contingency, however, is not considered likely.)

^{continued}
b. In the event of a stalemate, the USSR probably would devote moral and material support to strengthening mobilization in Communist held areas of Korea, directed at development of necessary strength of the North Koreans alone to break the stalemate in their favor. Use of Chinese Communist troops is a possibility but not a probability. Use of Soviet forces is extremely unlikely. Development of North Korean military strength probably would be accompanied by invitations to the southern government to surrender, to request UN forces to depart, and to participate in formation of a government for a "unified" Korea. (As increasing UN support arrives, a continued stalemate is likely only should increased mobilization in Korea balance augmentation of UN strength; therefore, this contingency is considered unlikely as a basis for USSR determination of courses of action discussed above.)

c. A successful UN counterattack based on clearly stipulated intent to attack only ^{to} the 38° Parallel presents the USSR with a more difficult selection of courses of action. It seems most probable that when the USSR estimates that the North Korean forces alone cannot hold against probable UN forces, but before effectiveness of UN forces has altered the situation unfavorably for the North Koreans, the USSR will propose a truce and mediation, leading to development of a government for a "unified" Korea. It would be estimated by the USSR that the height of Communist prestige resulting from its demonstration of power, and its military

SECRET

occupation of 85% (?) of Korea would assure creation of a Communist government. Designation and agreement on the mediating body, and on the terms for mediation, would present possibly insurmountable problems, but the resulting stalemate would not adversely affect the Communists' position which could be strengthened in its occupied areas. The USSR probably would not desire UN mediation, and would endeavor to disqualify the UN on grounds that it is one of the belligerents. Apart from offering itself to serve as mediator, it might propose that mediation be performed by a UN mediation body made up of nations that did not support the UN action on Korea. Further difficulty would arise over terms of the truce, the USSR insisting that the present military position be maintained, whereas the UN would insist on North Korean withdrawal to beyond the 38° Parallel. It seems quite possible that the USSR will propose a truce and initiation of discussion on bases for mediation. The anticipated stalemate would result, be encouraged by the USSR, and exploited as an opportunity to assure creation of Communist prestige in southern areas. Assured of its prestige, the USSR would assent to withdrawal to the 38° Parallel, accompanied by a propaganda orgy extolling its compromises in the interests of peace. Should the USSR estimate that it had gained support of the southern Koreans during the military occupation of the south, it would agree to some means of unification that would insure a Communist government of a "unified" Korea; otherwise, serious mediation efforts would subside, and the situation would be allowed to slip into the status quo ante. Unless the UN shows intent to go

beyond the 38° Parallel, this line of action would present the

SECRET -3-

SECRET

USSR with the easiest "way out", and is considered the most probable course of action. This probably will occur at an early date.

d. UN intent to carry the counter-offensive beyond the 38° Parallel would considerably complicate USSR choice of courses of action, as this would present the USSR with a choice of writing off its present control in Korea or of taking action that could well lead to global war. As the present UN position is to go only to the 38° Parallel, this contingency is deemed unlikely at this time.

SECRET -4-